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OF THE SUBLIME 
 
Bernard Beatty 




Cet article porte sur deux aspects importants. Le premier 
est le sens du sublime depuis Longin jusqu’à la résurrection 
de Longin par Boileau, soit le sublime que connaissait Byron 
(pas celui de Kant); le second concerne la citation suivante, 
de Byron : « c’est le sublime de cette sorte d’écriture-là1 ». 
Boileau et Longin soulignent ce qui est noble et qui élève 
l’esprit, tandis que le « cette sorte-là » de Byron est humble, 
contingent et fondé sur des bases empiriques. Je ferai valoir 
que la phrase « sorte d’écriture » lie les deux aspects, car 
même si Byron saisit intuitivement le nouveau sublime dont 
il fait la promotion tout en soulignant le burlesque en parlant 
du « terrible désir de vous y plonger2 », il n’associe pas au 
sublime un modèle de conscience mais bien un type 
d’écriture. C’est dans l’abysse du langage et de la véritable 
profondeur ontologique que veut plonger Byron. Je 
soutiendrai que la clé à cette singularité se trouve dans la 
position religieuse particulière de Byron. 
cet extraordinaire et ce merveilleux qui frappe 
dans le discours.  
Boileau, Préface to his translation of Traité du 
Sublime 
The word ‘sublime’ comes from the Latin sub limen which can mean 
either ‘under the lintel’ and thus straining upwards beyond our normal 
height and ceiling or ‘under the threshold’ in which case it means ‘open to 
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the depths below our normal place of standing’. These interpretations are 
hypothetical but it is clear that the sublime is etymologically spatial and 
suggests the interchangeability of above and below. Byron gives a very 
strange example of this in his use of the word ‘plunge’ to describe the 
ascent of birds fleeing from an earthquake:  
the birds  
Plunge in the clouds for refuge and withdraw  
From their down-toppling nests . . . .  
(CHP 4. 64) 
The nests fall downwards but the birds plunge, amazingly, upwards to the 
clouds as though the clouds are water into which they dive in the way that 
Neuha in The Island does when she cries “Torquil, follow me, and 
fearless follow! / Then plunged at once into the Ocean’s hollow” (4. 59-
60). 
Shelley makes much of this interchangeability of heights and depths in 
order to suggest the possibility of a different cosmos and consciousness 
than that we customarily think possible. Byron, I think, is more interested 
in the oddity of familiar consciousness and, in the end, is more likely to 
place the Sublime here than anywhere else. In The Island, he wants us to 
contrast Torquil’s creative, hope-generated plunge with Fletcher 
Christian’s desperate plunge when he: 
Cast one glance back, and clenched his hand, and shook  
His last rage ’gainst the earth which he forsook;  
Then plunged.  
(4. 339-41) 
The difference between these two downward plunges is emblematic of an 
ethical distinction. One plunge — Torquil’s — is fearful (you might 
drown) but implicitly hopeful (you might survive with Neuha); the other 
plunge — Christian’s — disguises its fear though defiance but is without 
hope. One is risky, the other is reckless. 
It is interesting then that when Byron comes to attach the word 
‘sublime’ directly to the idea of falling, though not here using the word 
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‘plunge’, he associates it in a well-known Ravenna journal entry (28 
January, 1821), with the now standard conjunction of hope and fear but 
also with the idea of choice: 
Why, at the very height of desire and human pleasure, 
worldly, social, amorous, ambitious, or even 
avaricious, — does there mingle a certain sense of 
doubt and sorrow — a fear of what’s to come — a 
doubt of what is — a retrospect to the past, leading to 
a prognostication of the future? (The best of Prophets 
of the future is the Past.) Why is this, or these? — I 
know not, except that on a pinnacle we are most 
susceptible of giddiness, and that we never fear falling 
except from a precipice — the higher, the more awful, 
and the more sublime; and, therefore, I am not sure 
that Fear is not a pleasurable sensation; at least, Hope 
is; and what Hope is there without a deep leaven of 
Fear? and what sensation is so delightful as Hope? 
and, if it were not for Hope, where would the Future 
be? — in hell. It is useless to say where the Present is, 
for most of us know; and as for the Past, what 
predominates in memory? — Hope baffled. Ergo, in 
all human affairs, it is Hope — Hope — Hope. 
Byron rarely thinks in an absolutely coherent way but he always 
thinks. The Sublime is wheeled in here because of the extra-human scale 
of the spatial extension (‘the higher, the more awful, and the more 
sublime’), because of the blurring of height and depths (the higher = the 
deeper fall), and the confusion of feelings (hope and fear). The main 
reason, however, is the element of choice which in turn is linked to a 
sense of time (‘a retrospect to the past, leading to a prognostication of the 
future’). There is a fearfulness and excitement attaching to the choice 
itself rather than to the fact of falling; a moral abyss as well as a real 
precipice. We may recall Byron’s description of Julia’s position just 
before she decides, without fully acknowledging it, to seduce Juan: “The 
precipice she stood on was immense, / So was her creed in her own 
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innocence” (DJ 1. 106-8). Julia’s precipice is moral and metaphorical. 
Manfred, the grandest of Byron’s precipice haunters, stands on a moral 
and literal one — the Jung Frau — just as Christian stands on a real crag.  
Why does Byron not use the word ‘plunge’ in his Journal extract? It is 
because, in the first instance, he is thinking of the fear of accidentally 
falling (‘on a pinnacle we are most susceptible to giddiness’) and only 
secondly of that active desire to fall which is in Manfred’s or Christian’s 
or Julia’s choice. But a year later remembering his own prose doubtless, 
he connects the two in Canto 14 of Don Juan in a passage which gives me 
my title: 
The very Suicide that pays his debt 
At once without instalments (an old way 
Of paying debts, which creditors regret) 
Lets out impatiently his rushing breath, 
Less from disgust of life than dread of death. 
5 
’Tis round him, near him, here, there, every where;  
And there’s a courage which grows out of fear,  
Perhaps of all most desperate, which will dare 
The worst to know it: — when the mountains rear  
Their peaks beneath your human foot, and there  
You look down o’er the precipice, and drear  
The gulf of rock yawns, — you can’t gaze a minute  
Without an awful wish to plunge within it.  
6 
’Tis true, you don’t — but, pale and struck with terror,  
Retire: but look into your past impression!  
And you will find, though shuddering at the mirror  
Of your own thoughts, in all their self confession, 
The lurking bias, be it truth or error,  
To the unknown; a secret prepossession,  
To plunge with all your fears — but where? You know not,  
And that’s the reason why you do — or do not. 
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There is the same interest here, not in the business of falling into and 
experiencing the abyss of space, but of being in the ‘do or do not’ position 
of a choice in time. Yet there is another element, only hinted at in the 
prose: ‘the lurking bias . . . to the unknown’. The phrase — ‘the lurking 
bias’ — is, I suggest, an assault on the new cult of the untethered Sublime. 
The idea that the Sublime may so fill the mind that one can think of 
nothing else, and that this can be related to terror, is familiar enough in 
Burke and in Kant but even when this is associated with melancholy, it 
dignifies and exalts. In the Don Juan stanzas, this isn’t so. We don’t boast 
about having a lurking bias. We come to it via the Suicide who is not 
exalted like Hamlet or De Vigny’s Chatterton, for he is clearly a panicky 
and cowardly individual whose impatience to let out his rushing breath is 
propelled by dread of death. This figure then becomes the model for 
everyman and the reader who, on a precipice or anywhere else, have ‘a 
secret prepossession to plunge’ and they have this precisely because the 
mystery of the ontological either/or into which we plunge matches exactly 
the ethical either/or of our decision to plunge or not to plunge. Worst of 
all is the comic tone and the comic rhyme which attach to this dilemma — 
‘you can’t gaze a minute / Without an awful wish to plunge within it’. It is 
a long way from the exalted Wordsworth on Snowdon’s precipice or 
Caspar David Friedrich’s A Wanderer above the Sea of Fog painted only 
four years earlier. 
My first point then is that Byron seems to be critiquing the Romantic 
Sublime by deliberately keeping the dimensions of real time, ethical 
choices, and common human situation from which the new Sublime seeks 
to be untethered.  
Byron implies my second major contention through another unusual 
word-usage: 
TO THE HON. DOUGLAS KINNAIRD Venice, Octr 26, 1819 
As to ‘Don Juan’, confess, confess — you dog and be 
candid that it is the sublime of that there sort of 
writing — it may be bawdy but is it not good English? 
It may be profligate but is it not life, is it not the 
thing? Could any man have written it who has not 
lived in the world? — and [t]ooled in a post-chaise? 
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— in a hackney coach? — in a gondola? — against a 
wall? — in a court carriage? — in a vis a vis? — on a 
table? — and under it? I have written about a hundred 
stanzas of a third Canto, but it is a damned modest — 
the outcry has frighted me. I have such projects for the 
Don but the Cant is so much stronger than the C--- 
nowadays, that the benefit of experience in a man who 
had well weighed the worth of both monosyllables 
must be lost to despairing posterity. 
‘The sublime of’ something or other is familiar usage. Blake talks of ‘the 
Sublime of the Bible’ in his Preface to Jerusalem. But we do not expect 
‘the sublime of that there sort of writing’ any more than we expect to 
laugh at someone dithering on a precipice. It is partly a matter of tone. But 
the most obvious subversion of the Romantic Sublime that it makes, is its 
assumption that the particular can be sublime since ‘that there’ must 
mean, in the first instance, the given, diverse, actual, particularity of 
circumstance; whereas the Kantian and Burkean sublime is associated 
with the formless object or boundless abyss rather than with the fact that 
the sleeping Juan very specifically “had a bed of furs, and a pelisse, / For 
Haidée stripp’d her sables off to make / His couch” (DJ 2. 133). 
In the second instance, which the context provides, ‘the sublime of that 
there’ is clearly associated with making love. And this is not a matter of 
making love on a Bollywood mountain-top to ‘the Ride of the Valkyries’ 
by Wagner but making love ‘on a table . . . and under it’. This is comic 
real love-making like that of Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde or Juan and 
Julia. It is true that Longinus found Sappho’s varied sexual emotions to be 
sublime but, by and large, the modern Sublime does not include sex of 
what Alex in Anthony Burgess’s Clockwork Orange calls ‘the old in out 
in out’ variety. Where sex is yearning, as in Tristan und Isolde, it is 
perfectly all right, for yearning is deferred to the infinite for its 
unparticularised satisfactions. From the Romantic Sublime’s point of 
view, inverting St. Paul’s wiser advice, it is better to yearn than to marry. 
There is a link then. It is the particular that-thereness of sexual experience 
which the Romantic Sublime can’t accommodate and Byron relentlessly 
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puts back into the equation. How can we bring together Byron’s precipice 
sublime and his that-there sublime? 
Byron’s boast is that he knows about the that-thereness of life and that 
his poem derives from that knowledge and represents it in a way that is 
sublime. But there is something of a gap in fact. Byron doubtless made 
love in lots of peculiar places — in gondolas and post-chaises and on the 
sofa at Seaham almost immediately after the wedding ceremony — at 
least he wishes us to think so, but Juan apart from his wedding night in a 
cave, makes loves in a bed. Why the emphasis on not doing so? 
Presumably because love-making in Byron’s list is unexpected and 
fraught with risk — adulterous lovers, I hazard, are more likely than 
married couples to make love in a gondolas or a Maserati. Byron’s Don 
Juan makes loves in risky circumstances, the outraged husband or father 
— Don Alfonso, Lambro, or the Sultan — could return or the rival lover 
could find out as Gulbeyaz does about Dudù and Juan and determines to 
kill both of them. A risky business making love or, for that matter, being 
in a shipwreck, a slave market, or a battle. When Juan isn’t at risk — with 
Catharine the Great — he gets sick all of a sudden. There is suddenly no 
that-thereness in his life or in the poem any more. Sex is familiar but 
always, for Byron, it is linked to what Boileau calls ‘cet extraordinaire et 
merveilleux’. The original Don Juan, seducer and trickster, associates 
love-making entirely with risk. He lives and exults in the precipice of 
danger that Donna Julia more timorously tiptoes round. He lives on the 
threshold of hope and fear, fulfilment and escape, but finally, as he 
knows, is bound to that future than Byron maps out in his journal entry: ‘if 
it were not for Hope, where would the Future be? — in hell’. Don 
Giovanni knows where he will end up for the one who chooses the 
modality of repeated escape as risk, also craves the denied but associated 
risk of capture and punishment. Byron’s Juan does not seek out risk in this 
way but love-making is always something extraordinaire et merveilleux 
for him as it was, — at least for its duration — we may presume, for 
Byron himself. 
But I have missed out two other emphases in this famous passage and 
risk distorting it. Byron is making a claim for truthfulness for Don Juan. 
Fidelity to the surprising, particular, repeatable yet diverse, irresistible and 
thrilling character of life’s energies and of our experience of constant 
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incongruity stuck, as it were midway, between primal energies, of which 
the sexual is the most powerful, and the diverse, actual, social and 
historical worlds to which we deeply and necessarily belong which are 
both, in some sense, produced by and yet stand in puzzling contrariety 
with primal energies. Don Juan holds to this tenaciously. 
The other emphasis that I have omitted is on language: ‘it is the 
sublime of that there sort of writing — it may be bawdy but is it not good 
English?’ ‘That there’ is a ‘sort of writing’; bawdiness is represented in 
‘good English’. This at once re-instates the connection between Sublime 
and style that is the main insistence of Longinus and Boileau who says 
that ‘cet extraordinaire et merveilleux . . . frappe dans le discours’. The 
relation between sublimity and language is increasingly emptied out in the 
eighteenth century — Burke and Kant use very few literary examples, and 
that is partly because literature, and especially poetry, is always a matter 
of the that-there of particular words and when it ceases to be registered as 
that-there, it becomes, as reading Chapman’s Homer or King Lear did for 
Keats, a jumping-off point into the ‘most dizzy pain’ with which he 
viewed the Elgin Marbles from which we have to be reluctantly recalled 
to the familiar ‘that-there’ disappointments of actual life. We get dizzy on 
a height for, as Byron says, ‘on a pinnacle we are most susceptible of 
giddiness’. There is ambiguous pleasure and pain in this giddiness for 
Keats and, doubtless for Byron too, but precipice-induced giddiness 
remains, for Byron but not for Keats, bound up with life and death choices 
that actual life is constantly asking of us. Shall we take this risk or not? 
The association of good English with life is a moral assertion too of 
course. It flies in the face of Southey to whom Don Juan is ironically 
dedicated and it is part of Byron’s claim that his poem is in the tradition of 
Milton, Dryden, and Pope. Life and Literature hang together — both 
proceed in risk, respond to and are judged by the that-thereness of their 
shaping. 
It is not surprising then that the journal passage about the precipice is 
put as a second Thought immediately under Byron’s famous definition of 
poetry as ‘The feeling of a Former world and Future’. The two thoughts 
are linked. Poetry, in Byron’s view, comes from the same precipice point 
of conjunction (‘a fear of what’s to come — a doubt of what is — a 
retrospect to the past, leading to a prognostication of the future’). Hence 
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in life, as in poetry, ‘it is Hope — Hope — Hope’ through which we live 
and it is the risk of Hope that we set against the known ending of life — 
Death — and the fact that we know that the constant risk-taking of 
Byron’s poem, Don Juan, too must eventually end. 
I have argued that Byron critiques the untethering of the Sublime from 
morals, the particular, the sexual, and from well-fashioned living language 
which had been accomplished within his life-time. Why then does he use 
the word at all? Why not write to Douglas Kinnaird something like this: 
‘As to ‘Don Juan’, confess, confess — you dog and be candid that it is 
ten-times better than the Laker’s dingy sublime, no this is that there sort 
of writing’. After all, he writes to Murray of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage: 
“You have so many ‘divine’ poems, is it nothing to have written a human 
one?” (6 April 1819). But he doesn’t write this. He makes a bid for the 
sublime. Don Juan is a sublime poem. Why and how? Easier to ask than 
to answer but Byron’s comment on Dr. Johnson gives us a clue: 
Tuesday, January 9, 1821 
Dined. Read Johnson’s Vanity of Human Wishes, — 
all the examples and mode of giving them sublime, as 
well as the latter part, with the exception of an 
occasional couplet. I do not so much admire the 
opening . . . But ’tis a grand poem — and so true! true 
as the 10th of Juvenal himself. The lapse of ages 
changes all things — time — language — the earth — 
the bounds of the sea — the stars of the sky, and every 
thing about, around, and underneath man, except man 
himself, who has always been and always will be, an 
unlucky rascal. The infinite variety of lives conduct 
but to death, and the infinity of wishes lead but to 
disappointment. 
Here Byron asserts that the literary style is sublime (‘All the examples 
and mode of giving them sublime’), that the grandeur of Johnson’s poem 
is bound up with its truth, and that the sublime of extension — the lapse 
of ages — which leads to barely imaginable vistas of change, is not there 
simply to give us Keats’s dizzy pain at aesthetically realised scale but 
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gives us moral insight. The focus of that moral insight is exactly the same 
as the Romantic Sublime — the relationship between human finitude and 
a graspable infinity — but the point is quite different for ‘The infinite 
variety of lives conduct but to death, and the infinity of wishes lead but to 
disappointment’. Here it is not only the vast spatial sweep that is sublime 
but a combined sense of finite and infinite which is not merely 
aesthetically grasped (the root of the Romantic Symbol), but is the 
grandeur and limitation known to the moral understanding. It is clear that 
for Byron, the moral is not opposed to the sublime and that a vista of 
human lives in the context of change is as much sublime as the stars in 
space or a waterfall. That-thereness is the conjunction of vista and the 
particular in a frame that is simultaneously moral and spatial. 
Parallel to this, I suggest, is a sense that sexual love, always a that-
there business, belongs to vista too — to the walk of Juan and Haidée 
along the open sea-shore, to Aurora Raby’s encompassing of infinite 
space in a particular person which stills and draws Juan. This is not a 
matter of Tristan and Isolde yearning but neither is it simply a matter of 
finitude or of tooling in a post-chaise. 
And this is the nub of the matter. Byron puns on cant and c…t but he 
does not pun on cant and the one whom he calls ‘the great Professor Kant’ 
(to rhyme with ‘jaunt’) in canto 10 (60). Doubtless of the three four-letter 
words, Byron knew the least about Kant. There can be no one in thought 
and personality further removed from Kant than Byron. Kant authorised 
that movement from real space to mental space that Byron deplored in his 
contemporaries. When he wished in the dedication of Don Juan that the 
Lakers would exchange their Lakes for Ocean, he means by Ocean 
something vast but real. Byron never wishes to stand in purely mental 
space:  
And therefore will I leave off metaphysical 
Discussion, which is neither here nor there:  
If I agree that what is, is; then this I call  
Being quite perspicuous and extremely fair.  
(DJ 11. 33-6)  
To be ‘neither here nor there’ is to desert the ‘that-there’. Byron in 
Don Juan stands between what is beyond the lintel and below the 
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threshold in the ‘that-there’ diversity of events which is part of the 
unstateable, customary, bewildering, living, ‘is’. ‘Is’ is not simply 
constituted by consciousness and is the temporal sphere of our choices. If 
the increasingly fashionable word ‘Sublime’ is the right word for an 
aspect of ‘is’, well then Byron will use it in the new way, but the usages 
which I have tried to call attention to in this paper suggest that Byron 
critiqued an untethered or free-standing Sublime. 
The main reason, I suspect, why this is so is because Byron never fully 
backed that blurring or elision, which in effect is displacement, of the 
religious by the Sublime that is the backdrop and justification for all the 
untetherings that I have described. It is easy to see why this is so. The 
Sublime and the aesthetic exist in the shadow of the religious for it is 
religion’s business to interrelate the finite and the infinite. When religion 
is strong therefore, as in the Middle Ages, the concept of the Sublime and 
the possibility of a free-standing sense of the aesthetic are impossible 
because both are already used up, tethered to the untethered. They re-
emerge, post Renaissance and Reformation, in Boileau’s Versailles and 
will pass as self-important entities, via eighteenth-century England and 
Germany to nineteenth-century America and to twentieth-century 
criticism. We could call this ‘secularisation’. As crucial as the 
aestheticising of landscape to this movement is Lowth’s Lectures on the 
Bible which make possible Blake’s phrase ‘the Sublime of the Bible’ 
which shows how radically irreligious is Blake and opens the 
transcendental highway to the criticism of Abrams, Bloom, Frye, and 
Hartman who could not accommodate Byron at all. In them the Romantic 
Sublime has accomplished its natural destination, as George Steiner might 
put it — literary criticism inventing modernity out of Romanticism’s 
usurpation of religious intuitions and assertions. Post-modernity is its 
jokey coda.  
In this way, the sublime is to religion as pornography is to sex. It takes 
out the best bits very determinedly, decontextualises them, and renders 
them ridiculous but makes your not finding them ridiculous in this new 
and separated guise, the condition of your excited attention. It is pretty 
ridiculous to feel sublime when standing on a precipice whether you are 
John Martin’s Lucifer or Gray’s Bard, Byron’s Manfred, or Laurel and 
Hardy. And Byron knows this perhaps better than anyone. However we 
276 Revue de l’Université de Moncton, Numéro hors série, 2005 
look at him, sceptic and Satanist, he neither by-passes religion nor seeks 
to transform it into something else. In some recognisable sense, it persists 
in him. If he has an awful wish to plunge from a precipice, he does not 
recognise this as the privilege of a Romantic poet nor as instance of 
superior aesthetic taste but as something inherent in man’s ambiguous 
risky state — half-dust, half-deity —, as much ridiculous as sublime but, 
in either case, fraught with risk as it is, humbled by exaltation like suicidal 
Manfred and exalted by fall like sexual Torquil, plunging upwards and 
downwards between lintel and threshold, ‘is it not life, the thing?’ 
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